Hings Ltd All articles
Guides

The Second Set of Bank Details: A Call-Back Drill for Small UK Buyers

Hings Ltd
The Second Set of Bank Details: A Call-Back Drill for Small UK Buyers

Photo: R. Milverton Drake, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

Invoice fraud is no longer a crude email from a stranger. In 2026 the polished version often arrives during a real order, from a plausible address, with the right invoice number and a calm request to update bank details. The target is not usually a large finance department. It is a small UK firm where one person orders, one person pays and everyone trusts the supplier.

The practical response is not alarm. It is a drill. The drill should be short enough to follow under pressure and firm enough to stop a payment even when the email looks genuine. The following steps can be adapted by any small buyer.

The principle: a change message is not authority

A request to change bank details is a high-risk instruction. It should never be actioned on the strength of an email alone, however well written. The same applies to a letter, a PDF or a message through a portal. The buyer should verify the change through a separate channel that it already trusts.

This means separating the person who orders from the person who approves payments. In a small firm the same person may do both, but the control can still be split at the moment of change. One person can prepare the payment. Another can verify the bank details. No single person should be able to add a new payee and release a payment without a second check.

Step one: freeze the payment

When a change request arrives, do not pay. Acknowledge receipt if a reply is needed to keep the order moving, but do not confirm the details or promise a payment date. Preserve the original email, including headers where possible. Note the sender address, the reply-to address, the time and any attachments.

If the request relates to an invoice already in the payment run, remove it. If a payment has already been made, contact the bank immediately and follow its recall process. Speed matters, but the first action is always to stop the next payment.

Step two: call a known number

The verification call should go to a number the buyer already holds: on the signed contract, on a previous statement, on the supplier's website entered independently, or in the buyer's own records. Do not use the number in the email. Do not use a number supplied in the same message chain.

A one-page call-back script is enough. It should be read, not improvised.

Good morning. This is [name] from [buyer firm]. We have received a request to change bank details for [supplier]. I am calling the number we hold on our signed contract, not the number in the email. Can you please confirm whether your bank details have changed? If they have, please confirm the account name, sort code and account number, and the name of the person authorising the change. Please also confirm the date from which the new details apply. I will send a written confirmation to the address we hold on file and will not release payment until that is returned.

The script does two things. It makes clear that the buyer is verifying independently. It also creates a record of the call, the person spoken to and the information confirmed.

Step three: authenticate in writing

A call is not the end of the process. Ask the supplier to confirm the change on letterhead, signed by a known authorised person, or through a secure portal that the buyer already uses. If the supplier is a regular trading partner, a director or account manager known to the buyer should confirm the change. If the supplier is new, the buyer should be more cautious, not less.

The buyer should update its records only after the written confirmation matches the call. The payment approval should then be made by a second person who has seen both the call note and the written confirmation.

Red flags worth teaching

None of these is proof of fraud on its own. Together they justify a pause.

The two-person rule that small firms can follow

A workable rule is: one person may request a new payee, but a second person must approve it. The person who approves must verify the details by call-back and see the written confirmation. If the firm is very small, the second person can be the owner, a bookkeeper or an external accountant. The important point is that the same person does not both create the payee and release the funds.

A second rule is equally useful: no bank-detail change is processed in the last two working days of the month unless a director has signed it off. Fraudsters rely on pressure and haste. A short delay is cheap.

Keep a record and rehearse the drill

Once a year, run a tabletop exercise. Take a real supplier invoice, invent a change request and ask the team to follow the script. Time how long it takes to find the contract number and reach the right person. Update the supplier contact list. Record the result in the finance file.

The aim is not to make staff suspicious of every email. It is to make the safe route the normal route. A buyer who can say, without embarrassment, that bank changes are always verified by call-back is a harder target. That is the whole point of the drill.

All Articles

Related Articles

Twelve Days Shut, No Calls Missed: Planning a Festive Break That Keeps Its Promises

Twelve Days Shut, No Calls Missed: Planning a Festive Break That Keeps Its Promises

The £40 Phone Call That Saved a £40,000 Order: Small Moments That Make or Break a Deal

The £40 Phone Call That Saved a £40,000 Order: Small Moments That Make or Break a Deal

Reading the Racking: Why a Walk Round a Supplier's Warehouse Beats Any Brochure

Reading the Racking: Why a Walk Round a Supplier's Warehouse Beats Any Brochure